2 are just some of the questions I address in this short intervention. In particular, the paper argues in support of pluralising the debate on climate change and migration. Indeed, as migration features ever more prominently in climate change policy and politics, it is imperative that scholars develop robust analyses that can help us better appreciate the political, ethical, legal and cultural dimensions of the relation between climate change and migration. With this in mind, this paper contributes to the pluralisation of the debate by reviewing recent research on the relation between climate change and migration from the vantage of three categories: neoliberalism, sovereignty, and otherness. These categories have not been chosen randomly. Rather they reflect just some of the ways scholars have sought to interpret this vexing phenomenon as much as they reflect my own judgement concerning the main issues at stake in the wider discourse of climate change and migration.
Here my reasoning is both general and specific to Geography. Migration is, of course, central to contemporary political economy which suggests that analysing migration in the context of climate change could provide important insight into the emerging political economies of climate change. So, too, analysing the relation between climate change and migration through the category of sovereignty allows us to consider how sovereign power is adapting to climate change. And finally inasmuch as the category 'migrant' acquires the status of Other in climate change discourse (Baldwin 2012; , otherness is a category that allows us to conceive of climate change not simply as an environmental or sociotechnical problem, but also as a social condition giving rise to new forms of social differentiation. Thus, all three categories -neoliberalism, sovereignty and othernessprovide ample scope to develop new lines of inquiry into this relation and thus pluralise how the relation might be understood. More specifically, though, these three concepts are central to the self-definition of much contemporary geography much of which seeks to understand how power functions in the world today. Indeed, all three categories provide important means for conceptualising power such that any attempt to evaluate how power functions in respect of the relation between climate change and migration would do well to engage with these categories.
There are, however, limits to how we might analyse this relation, but these are limits less to do with the shortcomings of analysis or theory, and everything to do with the limits of the relation itself. For if anything can be said about it, the relation between human mobility and climate change is impossible to disaggregate. Indeed, as many have long insisted (McGregor 1993 , Black 2001 , McAdam 2012 , establishing any sort of causal relation between environmental or climate change and migration is extremely problematic inasmuch as climate change can never be said to be the principal driver of migration decisions. Too many other factors -power, land tenure, labour markets, conflict and so forth -also account for migration decisions. At best all we can do is speculate from existing social and geophysical knowledge that climate change will entail some deep geohistorical transformations in which human mobility will figure prominently. Anything more than this would be conjecture. So rather than provide a unifying theory that aims to overcome the speculative nature of climate change and human mobility discourse, my goal here is to make a case for pluralising the debate on climate change and human mobility. Or to put this in slightly different terms, whereas it is often assumed that the key to deciphering the relation between climate change and migration is more and better research, 1 my aim is to hold this relation open to all manner of theoretical and methodological perspectives in a way that allows for it to become the basis for imagining new worlds and new possibilities for collective life.
2 1 This is precisely the assumption that lies at the heart of paragraph 14(f) of the Cancun Adaptation Framework which was agreed at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change COP16. The provision invites parties to the agreement to undertake "measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and international levels." We can interpret this provision as admittance on the part of national governments that knowledge about this relation is actually very weak. For more on this provision, see Warner 2012. Subsequent to COP16, human mobility and climate change are addressed in two distinctive domains of international policy making. Migration is now being taken up in the UNFCCC Working Group on Loss and Damages, reflecting in part how migration is framed as an issue of climate change adaptation. But human displacement, a subset of migration, is also being addressed through the Nansen Initiative which is a consensus-building exercise initiated by the governments of Switzerland and Norway to develop legal protections for people displaced over an international border as a result of environmental disasters, including climate change.
2 I wish to thank Noel Castree for this insight and for pushing me to look beyond critique as the primary mode of engaging with the topic of climate change and migration.
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Some background
Talk of the relation between human mobility and climate change may seem relatively new.
After all, it only first appeared in international climate change law in 2010 in a provision of the Cancun Adaptation Framework which calls on national governments "to improve and enhance understanding" of the relation between climate change and "human migration and displacement" (Warner 2012 , and yet the rhetorical appeal of their imagery is hard for many to resist, which is as much the case now as it was in the 1980s. So, too, then as now, the environmental or climate migrant is assumed to be both threat and victim. I argue later that this is a deeply problematic assumption, but it is one with enduring appeal nevertheless. And one further consistency between early discourses on environmental migration and those now underway on climate change concerns their grammatical form: it seems that the relation between human mobility and climate change is universally represented in the future-conditional tense (Baldwin 2012 Importantly, for White, this phenomenon and the terms used to describe it are 'essentially contested', meaning that people cannot agree on how to define the phenomenon, but nevertheless acknowledge that it is a phenomenon worth speaking about. My own preference is to describe this essentially-contested phenomenon as a relation between human mobility and climate change. I use the term relation because it designates a relationship between the two terms but without ever falling into the trap of referring to this relationship as determinist or causal by which I mean a relation in which climate change causes or determines human mobility. Instead, the category 'relation' allows for us to talk about the phenomenon as comprised of any number of ontological forms, as complex, corelational, or even future-conditional, all of which are important but which avoid specific 6 reference to determinism. And this leads immediately to the second issue, which is to do with causality.
It is now common practice for researchers to distance themselves from the language of causal determinism when writing on the topic of human mobility and climate change. This is for at least two reasons. First, the language of determinist causality bears the weight of early twentieth-century environmental determinisms according to which differences between groups of people were said to be pre-given by environmental conditions, a belief that underwrote early expressions of racism. No surprise scholars nowadays refuse determinist reasoning. But second, and equally important, no evidence exists that could substantiate a determinist claim. For as is now widely accepted across the field of human mobility and climate change research, human mobility cannot be explained solely in reference to environmental or climatic factors alone, since so many other intervening factors can also explain human mobility -labour markets, war and civil conflict being some of the more obvious. This is an argument often traced to earlier interventions by Richard Black (2001) and Astri Suhrke (1994) , one that has become almost de rigueur in recent years, and it echoes the widely-held position in migration studies that migration is never mono-causal (Massey, Arango et al. 2005) . But it also suggests that signifiers like 'human mobility and climate change' 'climate migrant' or 'climate-induced migration' have no underlying referent, no specific set of material relations to which they refer. Consequently, we might understand them as 'floating signifiers' by which I mean concepts with no inherent meaning. Instead, what seems to have emerged in the recent discourse on human mobility and climate change is that the relation is being described less and less as determinate and more and more in the language of complexity, or at least applied systems ecology. Here, I
take complexity to refer to the quality of a system in which cause (environmental change) and effect (human mobility) are said to be neither linear nor predictable but characterised by iterative feedbacks and thresholds and in which the systems themselves are said to be selforganising, adaptive and resilient. A good example of this discursive shift is found in a recent 7 effects on human well-being (Black, Bennett et al. 2011) . Thus, for the authors of the commentary, migration can be considered adaptive, for example, if it can be said to contribute to the resilience of a population or a community. By framing adaptive migration as an index of resilience, the comment piece thus appears to privilege the 'complex system' as the principle unit of social-ecological organisation for evaluating human mobility as opposed to, say, the nation-state, the individual, or the city. This is not to suggest that states, bodies or cities are somehow irrelevant for understanding human mobility. It does, however, imply that such entities are conceived as smaller systems or nodes embedded within wider systems or networks. Another example is found in recent work by Richard Black, Dominic
Kniveton and Kerstin Schmidt-Verkerk (Black, Kniveton et al. 2011 ) who describe human mobility as context-sensitive and nonlinear in the sense that the variables that coalesce to generate mobilities in one context may yield significantly different, unanticipated mobilities in another. The UK Foresight Report (2011) on migration and global environmental change is also noteworthy for characterising mobility as non-linear and counterintuitive. In pointing out that the discourse on human mobility and climate change has undergone a shift from determinism to complexity is not to suggest that this shift has been complete or total. Indeed, pronouncements that frame the human mobility effects of climate change in determinist language continue to be made by the media and within popular debate. It is simply to identify that the discourse on human mobility and climate change appears to be undergoing a shift in the very ontology by which its underlying (absent) referent is imagined, at least amongst academic researchers.
Pluralising the debate on human mobility and climate change
But if the relation between human mobility and climate change is contested, speculative, and complex, then how else might it be understood? What kinds of analytical resources are also available to us that will help us better appreciate what is at stake when we talk about this relation? How can we gain purchase on this rather evasive relation? To answer these questions I want to foreground three concepts that loom large throughout much of the 8 discourse on human mobility and climate change but with which geographers and other social scientists are only just beginning to come to terms: neoliberalism, sovereignty and otherness.
Neoliberalism
Neoliberalism is perhaps one of the most widely analysed and debated topics in contemporary geography (Harvey 2005 , Peck 2010 . My intention here is not to rehearse all the many important ways geographers have sought to understand neoliberalism, except to say that neoliberalism is broadly conceived as a mode of reason that gives primacy to the market in the organisation of economic, social, political and cultural relations, and, not surprisingly, one that partly organises the relation between human mobility and climate change. In a rather compelling thesis, Romain Felli (2012) observes how the unfolding policy narrative which promotes migration as a form of climate change adaptation bears some ideological resemblance with neoliberalism. Felli arrives at this insight by tracing out a shift (not unlike the one proposed above) in the institutional discourse on human mobility and climate change in which an increasing number of institutional actors, most notably the International Organisation for Migration, refer to human mobility in the language of migration and migration management as opposed to refugee-ism. That is, whereas institutions previously might have referred to 'climate refugees' to designate a subject victimised by climate change, nowadays more and more institutions refer to 'climate migrants' to designate a subject whose mobility is partly (but not exclusively) a function of climate change. Felli accounts for this shift by suggesting that it occurs within a wider discourse of international migration governance in which migration is conceived as an object managed by the state in the interest of capital accumulation (Geiger and Pécoud 2010; . His point is that for many policy makers unless otherwise managed through, for example, border restrictions, human mobility threatens to undermine the conditions for capital accumulation (i.e., workers might pass freely over borders 
Sovereignty
Political sovereignty and its correlate, territory, are two related areas of geography that bear significantly on human mobility and climate change. Political sovereignty commonly refers to the imagined, autonomous political authority that underwrites the nation-state. Territory, on the other hand, commonly designates the spatial extent of political sovereignty, which is often assumed, although not unproblematically, to coincide with state territorial borders.
Contemporary political geography, however, poses the problem of sovereignty and territory rather differently, having long argued that sovereignty is never absolute nor territorially constrained (Agnew 1994 , Agnew 2009 , Elden 2009 , Mountz 2013 . I would suggest that it is precisely this creative rethinking of the sovereignty-territory relation that should provide the basis for interpreting of how political sovereignty and territory function as key concepts in climate change and human mobility discourse. In this section, I outline two recent interventions on the relation between human mobility and climate change that can help us better understand how political sovereignty and territory are at stake. The first addresses the issue of bordering practices and transit states, and the second addresses how notions of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation might help us conceptualise the condition of statelessness that arises when a state's territory disappears due to rising sea-levels.
In Climate change and migration: security and borders in a warming world, Gregory
White (2011) suggests that the diaspora might be one such mooring for the stateless body and thus the basis for newly reterritorialised political community.
Answers to these questions are well beyond the scope of this paper. However, what
Blitz' intervention provides is a novel vocabulary for reconceptualising the human mobility effects of climate change. It suggests that at stake in the discourse of climate change and human mobility is a politics of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, a politics whose object referent is the simultaneous undoing and reconstituting of political community. In other words, if climate change implies human mobility (how could it not?), in the sense that people will need or will choose to relocate from their homes in order to adapt to climate change, and if this implies (in both a real and imagined sense) the circulation and mixing of bodies, then the outcome of this deterritorialisation process will be various reterritorialisations, newly configured political communities, some of which may resemble old forms of political community (i.e., nation-states), and others which may not. Thus, one of the most important political issues that arise in light of the future-conditional phenomenon of climate change and human mobility concerns the ways in which individuals, political authorities, and institutions respond to deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. Are these two processes ones to be 
Otherness
And finally, like neoliberalism and sovereignty, various expressions of difference are also deeply implicated in the discourse on climate change and human mobility. Here, we might come to understand the relation between climate change and human mobility by attending to the way in which the figure of human mobility i.e., the migrant, the refugee, asylum seeker, the nomad, and so forth, acquires the status of Other within climate change discourse.
Regularly the figure of the climate change migrant is positioned as Other to, or different from, the otherwise unmarked universal subject of climate change advocacy (Baldwin 2012) . For example, the climate change migrant is regularly said to represent a threat to national and international political stability (Hartmann 2010) . This is especially the case in a wider set of discourses concerned with climate security where the figure of the climate change migrant, or in some instances, the climate refugee, is routinely said to catalyse political violence. But the figure of the climate change migrant is also Othered in humanitarian discourses in which it is assumed to be victimised by a pending set of climatic catastrophes (Farbotko 2010, Farbotko and Lazrus 2012) . The argument has also been made that when positioned as either a threat or as a victim, as Other to an otherwise normal, unmarked subject of climate change discourse, the figure of climate change migration takes on racial connotations (Baldwin 2013 ). This argument draws from Paul Gilroy's (1991) claim that threat and victimhood are defining attributes of racialised bodies. It also draws from David Theo Goldberg's (2009) observation that racial connotations are regularly conceived in modernity as the "threat, the external, the unknown, the outside." However, when conceived as Other, the figure of climate change and human mobility discourse exhibits a very peculiar kind of alterity. Whereas otherness is most often conceived in cultural studies in the idiom of different from (Hall 1992) , in climate change and human mobility discourse otherness is, perhaps, better conceptualised as yet-to-come. In other words, we might conceive of the figure as originating in the future, albeit with implications for how we live in the present. This reflects the fact that the discourse on climate change and human mobility is almost always written in the future-conditional tense (Baldwin 2013) . But it also reflects the fact that the relation between climate change and migration is not actual, but virtual, by which I mean the relation is real but that it does not coincide with any actual presence or phenomenon.
Consequently, I would suggest that the figure of the climate change migrant is the potential embodiment of racial otherness, or the potential embodiment of threat, external, unknown, outside, as the potential to be out of place. This is not to suggest that subjectivities like 'asylum seeker', 'refugee', or 'migrant' are not already racialised. They are. It is simply to emphasise that otherness in the context of climate change and migration discourse exhibits a very different temporality than it does in other spatiotemporal contexts.
Much can be made of this analysis, but two related ideas are worth considering in light of my argument about the need to pluralise the debate on climate change and human mobility. The first concerns the fluidity or mutability of the concept of race. Whereas it is commonplace to assume that race itself is a floating signifier, an idea with no corresponding ontology, we also know that racisms persist; we can see their effects everywhere.
Consequently, even though we are regularly told that we live in a post-racial world, a world in which race is no longer said to matter as an object of thought, the persistence of racisms' effects suggest quite the opposite. They suggest that racisms continue to operate but without explicit reference to the category that gives these systems of prejudice their name.
So, rather than a repudiated category, race has the odd quality of being continuously rewritten, albeit through proxy categories that are made to stand in for racial difference and through which new racisms become articulated. This is a quality that has elsewhere been referred to as racisms' "polyvalent mobility" (Moore, Kosek et al. 2003, p.4) , or what Ann
Stoler calls racisms' "power to rupture with the past and selectively and strategically recuperate it at the same time" (Stoler 2002 , as quoted in Moore et al. 2003 . To give an example, Sherene Razack (2008) argues that "race thinking reveals itself in the phrase 'Canadian values' or 'American values,' uttered so sanctimoniously by prime ministers and presidents when they refer to what is being defended in the 'war on terror'" (p.8). Her claim is that Canadian and American values are here made to designate an innocent identity, i.e., whiteness, which needs to be shielded from the terrorist i.e., the racial other. Racism is at work here through a racialised language that refuses any reference to race. Indeed, as
Razack (2008) goes on to argue, "when we look for signs of racism's presence, then, it is not simply to be found in the racial hostility some individuals bear towards others not of their race, but also in the ideas that the state must protect itself from those who do not share its values, ideals of beauty, and middle-class virtues" (p.11). What Razack's account illustrates, then, is an example of racism in which race is left implicit, and one with immediate consequences for how we might analyse the relation between climate change and human mobility. For if we accept the reasoning that the figure of the climate change migrant bears implicit racial connotations, then the discourse on climate change and human migration becomes an integral site through which race thinking becomes rearticulated. Understanding how exactly this happens thus becomes an urgent task.
And this leads directly to the second idea: the pending conjugation between race thinking, the Anthropocene and the crisis of humanism. Not only is there an urgent need to understand the racial dimensions of climate change and human mobility discourse, but doing so also requires that we attend to the way in which the very category of the 'human' is being reconfigured in the context of climate change. One of racisms most ensuring features is the way it dehumanises people, the way it designates bodies as outside the category of the human. However, as we collectively enter an epoch often referred to as the Anthropocene, a geologic time in which the earth's geo-bio-physicality is said to be as much an expression of some innate force as it is an expression of humans' earth-shaping potency, the very category of the 'human' seems no longer certain. If the 'human' of humanism is said to have been founded upon the Enlightenment faith that the Human is distinct from Nature given the Human's agency to direct historical time, then we might say that the Anthropocene designates a 'post-human' epoch, 8 a period of geologic time in which the Human and Nature are now said to be fully imbricated (if, indeed, they were ever distinct (Latour 1993) ).
Consequently, it seems that the arrival of the Anthropocene, inaugurated in part by anthropogenic climate change, calls into question some of racisms' founding categories (i.e., 
Pluralising the debate: towards invention
The foregoing presents three different perspectives through which we might begin to make sense of the relation between human mobility and climate change. Up until now my aim has been to suggest that this relation can be analysed from any number of perspectives each of which hones in on and emphasises a different sub-set of relations. It is almost as though the relation between climate change and human mobility resembles a skein -the entanglements of earth, climate, economy, identity, state, ethnicity, and so forth -which can never be fully disaggregated but through which one can trace out a network of interconnecting subrelations. Neoliberalism, sovereignty, and otherness merely represent three unique vantages one can take to identify the significance of the relation. But one could also examine it using any number of other approaches and come up with an equally significant range of insights.
Feminist geopolitics, political geography, and globalisation immediately come to mind as additional possible routes into the relation.
I want to end, though, by taking seriously the plurality of approaches that have been used to analyse the relation between climate change and human mobility. This range of perspectives is important precisely because it allows us to see how the relation between climate change and human mobility is open to wide interpretation and, thus, a relation that can be, or better yet should be, contested, debated and challenged. And here I wish to suggest a rather different ethical stance we might adopt in respect of the relation between migration and climate change. Rather than assume we can overcome political disagreement by closing it down, by building a consensus around a singular ontological form (i.e., complexity vs determinate causality) or method of analysis (i.e., ethnography vs scenario planning), perhaps we should hold open the relation of climate change and migration. For, as Judith Butler (1992) argued long ago, to install foreclosure as an analytical feature of the political "enforces the boundaries of the domain of the political in such a way that that enforcement is protected from political scrutiny" (p.4). This, Butler suggests, is an "authoritarian ruse" by which political contestation becomes "summarily silenced" (p.4).
Indeed, it is precisely this type of argument that animates much of the post-political critique of climate change to which I alluded earlier. Thus, I would argue that the very contestability of the relation between climate change and human mobility suggests that we should refuse to foreclose this relation so long as we value democratic forms of social organisation.
Democracy, after all, is predicated on difference, contestation and refusal.
And finally, the need for contestation is all the more pressing given that the one thing
we do know about the relation between climate change and human mobility is that it is fraught with uncertainty. At the outset of my argument, I suggested that our epistemic understanding of the relation is thoroughly future-conditional; we conceive of it almost exclusively through future scenarios, modelling, forecasting and quantitative prediction, even magical realism and science fiction. But what these forms of knowledge tell us is that the full range of human mobilities, migrations and displacements that may arise under changing climatic conditions can never be known in advance. So here let me finish by paraphrasing Noel Castree (2013) : if the future is by definition uncertain, albeit constrained by various path dependencies, than the future is ours to make. That is, we can invent the future we want, rather than merely prepare for the futures that the experts tell us we should expect. And this is why pluralising the debate on climate change and migration is so important; we need a vast array of perspectives in order to help us stretch our thinking into the future. If the human mobility effects of climate change are to conjugate with existing unequal divisions of labour and territorial distributions of power and prejudices, then it would seem pertinent that whatever worlds we seek to invent should avoid reproducing existing forms of inequality and prejudice. One way to do this might be to remain faithful to the future as a site of infinite contestability, to conceive of this future as a site of infinite potential rather than foreclosure.
